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Abstract
We consider a channel separation approach to counter the pilot attack in a massive MIMO system,
where malicious users (MUs) perform pilot spoofing and jamming attack (PSJA) in uplink by sending
symbols to the basestation (BS) during the channel estimation (CE) phase of the legitimate users (LUs).
More specifically, the PSJA strategies employed by the MUs may include (i) sending the random symbols
according to arbitrary stationary or non-stationary distributions that are unknown to the BS; (ii) sending
the jamming symbols that are correlative to those of the LUs. We analyze the empirical distribution of the
received pilot signals (ED-RPS) at the BS, and prove that its characteristic function (CF) asymptotically
approaches to the product of the CFs of the desired signal (DS) and the noise, where the DS is the
product of the channel matrix and the signal sequences sent by the LUs/MUs. These observations
motivate a novel two-step blind channel separation method, wherein we first estimate the CF of DS
from the ED-RPS and then extract the alphabet of the DS to separate the channels. Both analysis and
simulation results show that the proposed method achieves good channel separation performance in
massive MIMO systems.
Index Terms
Massive MIMO, spoofing attack, blind channel separation.
R. Cao, H. Gao, D. Wang and Y. Lu are with the Key Laboratory of Trustworthy Distributed Computing and Service,
Ministry of Education, and also the School of Information and Communication Engineering, Beijing University of Posts and
Telecommunications (BUPT), Beijing 100876, China (e-mail: {caoruohan, huigao, wangdongqing, ymlu}@bupt.edu.cn).
T. F. Wong is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Florida, FL 32611, U.S.A. (e-mail:
twong@ufl.edu).
T. F. Wong was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant CCF-1320086.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
03
90
9v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  8
 Fe
b 2
01
9
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MMIMO) systems [1], [2] exhibit excellent potentials
for defense against passive eavesdropping attacks by using physical-layer security (PLS)
techniques [3]. Many of these PLS techniques however rely on the knowledge of channel
state information (CSI), which is often estimated in the training phase of a MMIMO system.
More precisely, the amount of CSI available to the system determines the secrecy performance.
Imperfect CSI often courses performance degradation [4], [5]. It is thus well known that MMIMO
is vulnerable to active pilot spoofing and jamming attack (PSJA) that aims to disturb the CSI
estimation process [6]. This PSJA vulnerability presents a weak spot for implementing PLS
techniques in MMIMO. For instance, in a time-divison-duplex (TDD) system, a legitimate user
(LU) sends pilots to the base station (BS) during phase of channel estimation (CE). Based on
reciprocity between the uplink and downlink channels, the BS estimates the uplink channel, and
uses the CSI for downlink beamforming. During the CE phase, a malicious user (MU) is free
to conduct pilot spoofing attack (PSA) by sending pilots identical to those of the LU or conduct
pilot jamming attack (PJA) by sending any other jamming symbols randomly. This misbehavior
of MU is referred as PSJA. Due to the existence of PSJA, the BS is beguiled into obtaining
a false channel estimate that is a combination of the legitimate and malicious user channels.
Beamforming with this false CSI in the downlink leaks information to the MU [7].
Many signal processing methods have been proposed to counter PSA in MMIMO systems.
In contrast, the work on PJA and PSJA is relatively sparse to the authors’ best knowledge. It is
because that the MUs may refuse to expose their employed pilot sequence set to the BS when
performing PJA or PSJA. The amount of knowledge of attacking has strong impacts on the BS’s
capability of counteracting attacks. Some related works are first reviewed as follows.
A. Related works
1) PSA detection: In refs. [8]–[18], the BS uses PSA detection methods that can determine
whether a PSA is conducted or not. In particular, in [8] and [9], the BS performs PSA detection
by comparing the statistical properties of its observations with partial CSI known a priori.
Refs. [10] and [11] detect PSA according to the existence of carrier frequency offset (CFO) since
CFO naturally exists due to frequency mismatch between LUs and MUs. In another family of
methods, the LU send random pilot symbols to the BS [12]–[17]. The random pilot symbols are
only known to the LU, and hence the MUs cannot send the same pilot symbols. The randomness
of the pilot symbols may reduce the effect of pilot contamination, and allows the BS to detect
PSA by determining the number of sources from which its observations come from. With sightly
difference, ref. [18] places two pilot sequences in one frame that is transmitted to the BS. The
power splitting ratio of the two pilot sequences is known to the BS but not to the MU. Then,
the PSA is detected by comparing the estimation result obtained by these two sequences. Refs.
[19] and [7] give detection methods performed by LUs. In these methods, the LUs and the BS
respectively estimate the channel using a two-way training mechanism. The PSA is detected by
comparing the estimation results obtained by the LUs and the BS.
2) Channel estimation under PSA: Refs. [20]–[24] focus on estimating the channels of the
LUs and MUs in the presence of PSA. The proposed methods all utilize different forms of
information or channel asymmetry between the LUs and MUs. In [20] and [21], the channel
estimation is performed by the LUs. If the BS wants to obtain the channel estimates reliably,
it may need to communicate with the LUs via a secure channel that the MUs cannot access.
In [22]–[25], the BS first uses independent component analysis (ICA) to separate channels,
and then employ asymmetry to match these separated channels with specific users. To be more
specific, in [22] and [23], it is assumed that some partial CSI (e.g., the path loss values) is known
to the BS a priori, and the a priori partial CSI of the LU is different from that of the MU. The
BS differentiates the LU channel from the MU channel by identifying the CSI difference. In [24],
[25], the asymmetry is based on the restriction that the LU can send encrypted information to
the BS while the MU cannot do so.
3) Channel estimation under PJA or PSJA: In [26], jamming sequence sent by a single MU
is assumed to be uniformly distributed over a unit complex-valued set. Based on this assumption,
the BS estimates the channel of the MU by projecting its observation into the null space of the
pilot sequences employed by LUs. More recently, there are some works on channel estimation
under PSJA [27], [28], where MUs are free to conduct either PSA or PJA. Both works separate
channels of MUs and LUs with well-designed pilot sequence sets, and use different a priori
partial CSI of MUs and LUs to match these separated channels with specific users. In [27], a
pilot sequence is randomly chosen from a code-frequency block group (CFBG) codebook. As
a benefit of CFBG’s property, BS firstly determines whether PSA or PJA is conducted. Then,
under PSA, the pilot sequences employed by MUs and LUs can be separated and be used for
channel estimation, but the channel estimation under PJA is not considered in [27]. In [28],
the pilot sequence set contains orthogonal sequences. The BS projects its received superimposed
signal into the space spanned over the orthogonal pilot sequence set. By comparing the projection
results in different dimensions, the pilot sequences of MUs or LUs can be separated. To facilitate
channel estimation, MUs are assumed to conduct PJA by sending Gaussian noise or conduct
PSA by sending a combination of several pilot sequences with uniform power.
4) Summary of related works: We note that attack detection methods have been investigated
extensively [7]–[19]. Some PSA detection methods can be extended for PJA or PSJA detection.
In channel estimation works [20]–[28], the MUs are cooperative in the sense that they send
information following certain statistical distributions that are known to the BS and independent
with the symbols of LUs [22]–[28], or they keep silent when the LUs feed back the estimated
results to the BS [20], [21]. As a beneficial result, some efficient methods or criteria, such as ICA
or MMSE and etc, can be employed to facilitate channel estimation. However, in some practical
scenarios, the MUs are likely to be incooperative, more powerful and more clever [29]. More
specifically, such MUs are free to send interference symbols according to arbitrary statistical
distribution that is non-stationary and unknown to the BS, and the interference symbols may
even depend on the information of LUs. Also, the MUs may send jamming symbols through
all possible communication phases between the LUs and the BS. For such powerful MUs, the
performance of existing works may degrade or no longer be provably unbreakable. To this end,
new schemes should be proposed.
B. Contributions of this paper
In this paper, we investigate how to obtain CSI for the BS in the presence of the powerful
MUs. Since the powerful MUs may interfere the BS during all possible communication phases
between the BS and LUs, it is important to constitute a channel estimation mechanism that
allows the BS to exchange pilot or training information with the LUs individually. To this end,
we focus on separating the channel directions of the LUs and the MUs. To be more specific, we
consider the following attack scenarios including the powerful MUs:
1) The MUs are free to send the same random symbols as that of LUs, or to send jamming
symbols according to arbitrary stationary distributions unknown to the BS, or to vary their
used distributions over different transmission instants;
2) The MUs may overhear the symbols sent by the LUs, and send symbols according to their
overheard signals;
3) The BS does not know which type of attacks is conducted by the MUs.
Although the separated channel directions are just partial CSI, with these separated channel
directions, the BS is able to receive information of only one user at a time, and thus eliminate
the interference from other non-target users. Also, the BS is able to focus its transmission power
towards only one target user at a time. In summary, the BS can separately receive and transmit
to the LUs and MUs without interference and leakage, which guarantees the performance of
using asymmetry configurations (e.g., higher layer authentication protocols, etc) to distinguish
between them, and finally complete full CSI estimation.
Notice that part of work is reported in our previous conference paper [30]. We detail
contribution of this paper as follows that make the paper essentially differentiate to [30].
1) In this paper, we propose a general method in the sense that the proposed method is
available to multi-LU against multiple powerful malicious users. On the contrary, in [30],
we only consider a special scenario where single-MU and single-LU both employ BPSK
modulation. In particular, for the general scenario, we propose a blind channel separation
method in which the BS quantizes its observations, and obtains the empirical distribution
of quantized observations for channel separation. It is interesting to note that this empirical
distribution is impacted by the channel directions and the distribution of the data symbols.
As such, the channel directions can be extracted from the empirical distribution observed
by the BS, and hence achieving blind channel separation.
2) We also analyze the performance of our proposed method in this paper. On the contrary,
performance analysis is not presented in [30]. Our analysis work reveals that as the number
of observations and quantization levels approach infinity, the BS is able to achieve channel
separation with nearly errorless performance. As a beneficial result, our simulation shows
that the directed-to-leakage power ratio achieved by our proposed blind channel separation
method is close to that obtained with perfect CSI.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model of the MMIMO system and the general
scenario of spoofing attack will be described in Section II. The proposed blind channel separation
method will be detailed in Section III. Simulation results will be presented in Section IV to
evaluate the performance of the proposed method. Finally, conclusions will be drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the system model depicted in Fig. 1, where a BS estimates the uplink channels
from NL LUs in the presence of NM MUs. The BS is equipped with M antennas, while the
Fig. 1: System model: the BS is equipped with M antennas. The legitimate and malicious users
have a single antenna each.
MUs and LUs are each equipped with a single antenna. For facilitating channel separation
in MMIMO system, M , NL, and NM are required to satisfy M  NM + NL. The uplink
and the corresponding downlink channels satisfy reciprocity. We perform channel separation to
allow beamforming to individual users over the downlink channels. Assume that the channel
separation process is performed within the coherent time of the channels. For j = 1, . . . , NL
and k = 1, . . . , NM , we use the M × 1 vectors hj and gk to specify the channels from the jth
LU and the kth MU to the BS, respectively. Whenever needed, β1,j and β2,k denote the path
losses of channels of the jth LU and the kth MU, respectively. In the uplink, the jth LU and the
kth MU send random symbols Aj and Bk to the BS, respectively. We allow A1, . . . , ANL and
B1, . . . , BNM to follow any arbitrary distributions over any finite alphabets. The distributions
of B1, . . . , BNM are likely to vary over instants. Note that since arbitrary symbol distributions
are allowed, the proposed scheme will work for both pilot and data symbols. We assume that
the distributions of A1, . . . , ANL are known to the MUs, while the distributions and even the
alphabets of B1, . . . , BNM are, on the contrary, unknown to the BS and the LUs.
For j = 1, . . . , NL and k = 1, . . . , NM , let us use Aj and Bk to denote alphabets of the j-th LU
and the k-th MU, respectively. aj and bk denote the generic elements of Aj and Bk, respectively.
PAj (·) and PBk (·) are the distributions of Aj and Bk, respectively. PA1,...,ANL ,B1,...,BNM (·) denote
joint distribution of A1, . . . , ANL , B1, . . . , BNM . We assume in each instant, the joint distribution
of A1, . . . , ANL and B1, . . . , BNM satisfies PA1,...,ANL ,B1,...,BNM (a1, . . . , aNL , b1, . . . , bNM ) > 0
whenever PA1 (a1) > 0, . . . PANL (aNL) > 0, and PB1 (b1) > 0, . . . , PBNM (bNM ) > 0. This
assumption indicates A1, . . . , ANL and B1, . . . , BNM may be dependent with each other, but
arbitrary Bk cannot be exactly determined by other variables. In practice, it corresponds to the
fact that the kth MU sends Bk according to its overheard version of A1, . . . , ANL . Nevertheless,
the kth MU cannot get A1, . . . , ANL exactly because of the channel fading and noise.
The received symbol of the BS is specified by
y = HA+GB +w, (1)
where w is the noise vector, whose elements are i.i.d. circular-symmetric complex Gaussian
(CSCG) random variables with zero mean and variance σ2, and H = [h1,h2, . . . ,hNL ], G =[
g1, g2, . . . , gNM
]
, A = [A1, . . . , ANL ]
T , and B = [B1, . . . , BNM ]
T .
Assuming that the uplink channel described by (1) is used n times within the coherent time
of the channel, for the ith instant of use, (1) gives rise to
yi = HAi +GBi +wi, (2)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where Ai is NL×1, and Bi is NM×1. They are transmitted symbol vectors
of the LUs and the MUs in the ith instant, respectively, and wi is the noisy vector in the ith
instant. Stacking the n equations in (2) into a matrix form, we obtain
Y = [H ,G]
 A
B
+W (3)
where Y = [y1,y2, . . . ,yn], W = [w1,w2, . . . ,wn], A = [A1,A2, . . . ,An], and B =
[B1,B2, . . . ,Bn]. A and B are NL×n and NM×n matrices, respectively. In MMIMO systems,
it is likely that the columns of [H ,G] are linearly independent. We make this assumption
throughout this paper. Note that linear independence is the only requirement that we impose on
the channel vectors. Thus correlations among antenna elements are allowed.
The existence of NM MUs could be detected by attack detection schemes (see [17] for
example). Focusing on channel separation, we assume the detection of MUs is perfect. Reiterating
our attack model, NM and NL are known to the BS based on extensively research on attack
detection techniques [7]–[19]. Following the existing works, we assume that each user has single
antenna and the system works in TDD mode. Unlike the existing techniques, however, the BS
does not know the exact distributions of B1, . . . , BNM , {β1,1, . . . β1,NL}, {β2,1, . . . β2,NM}, H , or
G a priori. In this sense, our proposed channel separation is blind to the BS.
Let S be the M × (NL + NM) signal subspace matrix whose columns form an orthonormal
basis that spans the column space of [H ,G]. Then, we project Y onto the signal subspace and
get from (3)
Z =
1√
M
STY = [Z ′1,Z
′
2]
 A
B
+N (4)
where [Z ′1,Z
′
2] =
1√
M
ST [H ,G], Z ′1 =
[
z′1,1, . . . ,z
′
1,NL
]
, Z ′2 =
[
z′2,1, . . . ,z
′
2,NM
]
, N =
1√
M
STW, and the elements of N are i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with zero mean and
variance σ
2
M
. Clearly, N is independent of [Z ′1,Z
′
2]
 A
B
. It is argued in [31] that this
independence and the Gaussianity of N imply that[
Hˆ , Gˆ
]
=
√
MS [Z ′1,Z
′
2] (5)
would be a reasonable estimator for the channel pair [H ,G] if [Z ′1,Z
′
2] could be found. In
practice S is not known a priori, but can be estimated from the singular value decomposition
Y = UΣV T with orthogonal matrices U ∈ RM×M , V ∈ Rn×n and M × n diagonal singular
value matrix Σ. Then S can be well approximated by the first (NL +NM) left singular vectors
in U when M is large in the MMIMO system [31].
Incidentally, we can show that [Z ′1,Z
′
2] cannot be uniquely determined from Y without
additional authentication, or the knowledge of {β1,1, . . . β1,NL}, {β2,1, . . . β2,NM}, A, and B.
Notice that when A and B have the same distribution in PSA, swapping the columns of [Z ′1,Z
′
2]
by observing Z in (4) would not change the distribution of Z. Thus, it is impossible to obtain
any decision rule among the permutations of the columns of [Z ′1,Z
′
2].
As will be argued in the next section, it is however possible to separate channels in the
sense of estimating
[
h1
|h1| , . . . ,
hNL
|hNL |
, g1|g1| , . . . ,
gNM
|gNM |
]
via (5), up to a permutation of the columns
and a phase ambiguity on each column. Interchangeably, we also term the above-mentioned
separation as channel direction separation, because the obtained
[
h1
|h1| , . . . ,
hNL
|hNL |
, g1|g1| , . . . ,
gNM
|gNM |
]
characterizes the channel directions of all users. As a result, we will be able to separate the
downlink beamforming directions from the BS to the LUs and MUs based on channel reciprocity.
III. BLIND CHANNEL SEPARATION
First, notice that the columns of [Z ′1,Z
′
2]
 A
B
 are (NL+NM)×1 random vectors that range
over the alphabet Z =
{∑NL
j=1 ajz
′
1,j +
∑NM
k=1 bkz
′
2,k : aj ∈ Aj, bk ∈ Bk
}
, where Aj and Bk are
the respective alphabets of Aj and Bk, for j = 1, . . . , NL and k = 1, . . . , NM . The main idea
of our channel separation scheme is to use Z to obtain [Z ′1,Z ′2] up to a column permutation,
and then achieve the desired separation of channel directions via (5). In this section, we will
first illustrate how to separate channels from perfect Z , then propose estimation of Z based
on received observations, finally give a method indicating channel separations from received
observations step-by-step.
A. Channel separation from perfect knowledge of Z
For easy description of our proposed method, we give two definitions.
Definition 1. For v ∈ Z , v′ ∈ Z , v 6= v′, if one vector z′ /∈ Z satisfies
(v − v′)H
|v − v′| |z′|z
′ = exp (iθ) , (6)
where θ could be arbitrary angle, we refer to this property as z′ covers v and v′.
Definition 2. For z′ 6= 0, z′ /∈ Z , subset Zs ⊂ Z , if arbitrary v ∈ Zs, ∀v′ ∈ Zs such that z′
covers v and v′, we refer to this property as z′ covers Zs or z′ covers |Zs| points of Z .
According to Definition 2, if z′ covers Zs and Zs = Z , we term that as z′ covers Z .
Then, to explain how we may obtain [Z ′1,Z
′
2] from Z , let us start by considering an example
with NL = NM = 1 and both the LU and MU send BPSK symbols. That is, Z ′1 =
[
z′1,1
]
,
Z ′2 =
[
z′2,1
]
, and Z =
z′1,1 + z′2,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
vA
,−z′1,1 + z′2,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
vB
, z′1,1 − z′2,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
vC
,−z′1,1 − z′2,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
vD
. Then, it is clear
that
vA − vB = 2z′1,1, (7)
vC − vD = 2z′1,1. (8)
According to Definition 2, (7) and (8) jointly indicate that z′ covers Z . Similarly, it is easy to
see that vA − vC = 2z′2,1, vB − vD = 2z′2,1, and hence z′2,1 also covers Z . On the other hand,
as long as z′1,1 and z
′
2,1 are linearly independent, we have that only vA − vD = 2z′1,1 + 2z′2,1
and vB − vC = 2z′2,1 − 2z′1,1. Thus, neither z′1,1 + z′2,1 nor z′2,1 − z′1,1 covers Z . Note that the
above cases exhaust the differences between all pairs of points in Z . In summary, among all the
pairwise differences, each of {z′1,1, z′2,1} covers Z , but each of {z′1,1 + z′2,1, z′2,1 − z′1,1} does
Fig. 2: Subfigures (a) and (b) show that all points of Z lie on lines along the directions of z′1,1
and z′2,1, respectively. Subfigures (c) and (d) show that only two points in Z lie on lines along
the directions of z′1,1 + z
′
2,1 and z
′
2,1 − z′1,1, respectively.
not. As a result, we may obtain z′1,1 and z
′
2,1 from Z by finding out all pairwise differences
that cover Z . It turns out that this observation extends to the general case as summarized in the
proposition below:
Proposition 1. Consider the general alphabet Z =
{∑NL
j=1 ajz
′
1,j +
∑NM
k=1 bkz
′
2,k : aj ∈ Aj, bk ∈ Bk
}
where Aj and Bk, for j = 1, . . . , NL and k = 1, . . . , NM , are finite and with cardinalities at
least 2. As long as columns of {z′1,1, . . . ,z′1,NL , z′2,1, . . . ,z′2,NM} are linearly independent, every
vector in
{
z′1,1, . . . ,z
′
1,NL
, z′2,1, . . . ,z
′
2,NM
}
covers Z . On the contrary, each vector of the form∑NL
j=1 c1,jz
′
1,j +
∑NM
k=1 c2,kz
′
2,k, where at least two coefficients in {c1,1, . . . , c1,NL , c2,1, . . . , c2,NM}
are nonzero, does not cover Z .
Proof: See the Appendix A.
Notice that in massive MIMO system, columns of [H ,G] are linearly independent in
probability. It indicates that columns of {z′1,1, . . . ,z′1,NL , z′2,1, . . . ,z′2,NM} are almost always
linearly independent.
Proposition 1 allows us to obtain the columns of [Z ′1,Z
′
2] by finding all the pairwise differences
of vectors in Z that covers Z itself. The steps given below show how Proposition 1 works on
Z . We use P1, P2 and P3 to label steps in this perfect case.
P1 Let us write Z = {v1, . . . ,v|Z|}, obtain the set of pairwise differences D = {vi − vj :
i < j and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , |Z|}}.
P2 Find subsets D∗, D1, . . ., DT , these subsets simultaneously satisfy following conditions.
D∗ = {d1,d2, . . . ,dT} ⊆ D
Dt =
{
d ∈ D :
∣∣∣∣∣ dHdt∣∣d∣∣∣∣dt∣∣ − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
}
, t = 1, 2 . . . , T
D =
T⋃
t=1
Dt,Ds ∩ Dt = ∅, s 6= t.
Notice that Dt depends on dt. It is the tth element of D∗. For each t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, if
vi − vj ∈ Dt, then we collect vi and vj in Zt.
P3 Define the weight of dt as W (dt) = |Zt|. Use the NL+NM vectors in D∗ with the largest
weights as estimates of the columns of [Z ′1,Z
′
2].
In step P1, all pairwise differences of Z are obtained. Then, in step P2, we get Z1, . . . ,ZT . They
are covered by pairwise differences according to Definition 2. Finally, step P3 separates channels
by finding NL + NM vectors, each of which covers the most points. It exploits Proposition 1
that only pairwise differences along directions of channels could cover most points.
The above-mentioned steps are implemented for the perfect case that we have Z . Let us go
back to practical where Z is unknown. To separate channels, we need to to estimate Z from
the observation Y given in (3), which will be discussed in next subsection.
B. Estimation of Z based on Y
To estimate Z , we first consider the case that the columns of [Z ′1,Z ′2]
 A
B
 are i.i.d. vectors
in order to introduce our method of estimating Z . In Proposition 2, we will prove that the
proposed method is also applicable to the case of non-i.i.d. columns. Further notice that the
columns of N in (4) are i.i.d. random vectors that have the same distribution as that of the
generic (NM + NL) × 1 random vector n, whose elements are independent Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and variance σ
2
M
. If the columns of [Z ′1,Z
′
2]
 A
B
 are i.i.d. random
vectors that have the same distribution as the generic (NM + NL) × 1 random vector z′, then
the columns of Z, given in (4), are i.i.d. random vectors that have the same distribution as that
of z = z′ + n. Let Fz, Fz′ , and Fn denote the distributions of z, z′, and n, respectively. Then,
because z′ and n are independent, we have
ΦFz(ω) = ΦFz′ (ω) · ΦFn(ω). (9)
where ΦF (ω) denotes the characteristic function of the distribution F , and ω =
[ω1, . . . , ω2NL+2NM ]
T is the (2NL + 2NM) × 1 frequency vector. Note that the noise variance
parameter σ2 is a characteristic of the receiver circuitry and can be measured a priori. We may
assume that its value is known, and thus ΦFn(ω) = exp
{
− σ2
4M
|ω|2
}
is also known. On the
other hand, Fz can be approximated by the empirical distribution of Z obtained directly from
the observation Y as in (4). Hence the distribution Fz′ of z′ can be estimated using (9).
For ease of discussion, let us also use z to denote a generic column in the matrix Z. To estimate
Fz′ efficiently, we quantize z = [z1, . . . , zNL+NM ]
T and use FFT to obtain the characteristic
function of the quantized version of z as follows. Consider m1 quantization levels u˜1, u˜2, . . . , u˜m1 ,
and the corresponding quantization intervals B (u˜1) ,B (u˜2) , . . . ,B (u˜m1):
− α1 = u˜1 < u˜2 < u˜3 < · · · < u˜m1−1 ≤ α1 = u˜m1 ,
B (u˜j) =

(−∞, u˜1] , j = 1
(u˜j−1, u˜j] , j = 2, 3, . . . ,m1 − 1
(u˜m1−1, +∞) , j = m1
(10)
where α1 > 0, u˜j − u˜j−1 = δ1 for j = 2, 3, . . . ,m1. Hence, we have m1 =
⌈
2α1
δ1
⌉
+ 1. The
elements z1, . . . , zNL+NM are respectively quantized to z˜1, . . . , z˜NL+NM according to:
z˜i =
m1∑
j=1
u˜j 1 (< (zi) ∈ B (u˜j)) + i
m1∑
j=1
u˜j 1 (= (zi) ∈ B (u˜j)) , i = 1, . . . , NL +NM , (11)
where 1 (·) denotes the indicator function. The quantized version of z is then z˜ =
[z˜1, . . . , z˜NL+NM ]
T . Write U˜ = {u˜1, u˜2, . . . , u˜m1}, then the alphabet of z˜ is U˜ (NL+NM ) ×
iU˜ (NL+NM ). We will denote it and enumerate its elements as Z˜ =
{
u˜1, u˜2, . . . , u˜m2NL+2NM1
}
.
Let Z˜ = [z˜1, z˜2, . . . , z˜n], where the ith column z˜i is the quantized version of the ith column
of Z. Next, obtain the empirical probability mass function (pmf) of the columns of Z˜ as
4Fz˜ (u˜j) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
1 (z˜i = u˜j) (12)
for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m2NL+2NM1 . Thus, the characteristic function of the empirical distribution 4Fz˜
is
Φ4Fz˜ (ω) =
m
2NL+2NM
1∑
j=1
4Fz˜ (u˜j) exp
{
−i
[
<
{
u˜Tj
}
,=
{
u˜Tj
}]
ω
}
(13)
where i =
√−1.
Similarly, let Z˜′ = [z˜′1, z˜
′
2, . . . , z˜
′
n], where the ith column z˜
′
i is the quantized version of the ith
column of [Z ′1,Z
′
2]
 A
B
. To do this quantization step, we employ an extended quantization
alphabet Z˜ ′ =
{
v˜1, v˜2, . . . , v˜m(2NL+2NM )2
}
, which is obtained by employing the same uniform
quantization in (10) with m2 quantization levels covering a range (−α2, α2). The length of each
quantization duration is δ2. Hence, we have m2 =
⌈
2α2
δ2
⌉
+ 1. To facilitate analysis, we assume
Z˜ ′ is an extension of Z˜ , i.e., Z˜ ⊂ Z˜ ′. Then, the empirical pmf of the columns of Z˜′ is
4Fz˜′ (v˜j) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
1 (z˜′i = v˜j) (14)
for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m2NL+2NM2 .
Using Φ4Fz˜ (ω) in place of ΦFz (ω) and 4Fz˜′ in place of Fz′ in (9), we obtain the estimator
4F̂z˜′ = Φ−1
(
Φ4Fz˜ (ω)
ΦFn (ω)
)
(15)
for 4Fz˜′ , where Φ−1 denotes the inverse Fourier Transform with respect to (13). Note that the
forward and inverse Fourier Transforms in (15) can be efficiently implemented using FFT and
inverse FFT (IFFT), respectively. The asymptotic accuracy of this estimator is addressed by
Proposition 2 below:
Proposition 2. By choosing n = Ω
(
m
2(NL+NM )
2
)
, m2 = Ω (m31), α1 = α2, 2α1 = (m1 −
1)δ1, 2α2 = (m2 − 1)δ2, and m2−1m1−1 is integer, there exists m2 → 0 as α1 → ∞, m2 →
∞, δ1 → 0, and δ2 → 0 such that whether Z is i.i.d. or non-i.i.d., as long as <{Z} ⊆
[−α1, α1 − δ2]NM+NL , ={Z} ⊆ [−α1, α1 − δ2]NM+NL , then the proposed estimator (15) has∣∣∣4Fz˜′ (v˜j)−4F̂z˜′ (v˜j)∣∣∣ ≤ m2 for j = 1, 2, . . . ,mNL+NM2 .
Proof: See the Appendix B.
[−α1, α1 − δ2]NM+NL indicates Cartesian product of [−α1, α1 − δ2] with NM +NL times. The
assumptions of <{Z} ⊆ [−α1, α1 − δ2]NM+NL and ={Z} ⊆ [−α1, α1 − δ2]NM+NL indicate that
Z must be included in the quantization range. This could be achieved as α1 → ∞, while the
transmitted power of MUs and LUs are not infinite.
Now, notice that Z is the support set of the empirical distribution, 4Fz′ , of the columns
of [Z ′1,Z
′
2]
 A
B
. Clearly, as the quantization is fine enough, 4Fz˜′ approximates 4Fz′ well.
Thus, Proposition 2 tells us that we may use the essential support set
Ẑ =
{
u˜ ∈ Z˜ : 4F̂z˜′ (u˜) > m2
}
of 4F̂z˜′ to estimate Z .
It is worth noting that Proposition 2 does not require the columns of Z˜′ to be i.i.d. random
vectors as detailed in the proof. Thus, Proposition 2 extends the attack model to allow the MUs’
symbols to be arbitrary distributed, as discussed before.
Remark 1. Proposition 2 empowers our proposed method to be applicable even in the presence
of the powerful MUs, who send symbol sequences following arbitrary unknown distribution. On
contrast, some existing channel separation or estimation works based on maximum likelihood
theory are no longer useful in the presence of the powerful MUs, since these works need to
know the distributions of MUs’ symbols a priori.
Remark 2. In addition, we use only the support of 4F̂z˜′ to estimate Z . Correlations between
the columns of Z are immaterial to the proposed scheme. It indicates that our proposed scheme
allows the symbols of MUs to statistically depend on the symbols of LUs. This property differs
our work with ICA-based methods, which require symbols of MUs and LUs to be independent
with each other.
C. Blind channel separation method
According to Propositions 1 and 2, practical channel separation method could be achieved.
In particular, Proposition 2 is used for estimating Z . In other words, Ẑ is obtained. Then,
Proposition 1 achieves channel separation based on Ẑ .
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we can obtain the following practical channel separation
method:
1) Perform SVD on the observation matrix Y, collect the first NL +NM left singular vectors
as columns of S, and obtain Z = 1√
M
STY.
2) Quantize the columns of Z to obtain Z˜ = [z˜1, z˜2, . . . , z˜n], based on (11). Obtain the
empirical pmf 4Fz˜ of the columns of Z˜ as described in (12).
3) Employ (15) to obtain 4F̂z˜′ via FFT and IFFT.
4) Choose a small  > 0. Obtain the essential support set Ẑ =
{
u˜ ∈ Z˜ : 4F̂z˜′ (u˜) > 
}
.
5) Write Ẑ =
{
v̂1, v̂2, . . . , v̂|Ẑ|
}
. Obtain the set of pairwise differences D ={
v̂i − v̂j : i < j and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , |Ẑ|}
}
.
6) Choose a small γ > 0. Find subsets D∗, D1, . . ., DT , these subsets simultaneously satisfy
following conditions.
D∗ = {d1,d2, . . . ,dT} ⊆ D
Fig. 3: An example of comparison between Z and Ẑ . They are illustrated in subfigures (a) and
(b), respectively.
Dt =
{
d ∈ D :
∣∣∣∣∣ dHdt∣∣d∣∣∣∣dt∣∣ − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ
}
, t = 1, 2 . . . , T
D =
T⋃
t=1
Dt,Ds ∩ Dt = ∅, s 6= t.
Notice that Dt depends on dt. It is the tth element of D∗. Algorithm 1 is gave for
illustrating how to find such D1,D2, . . . ,DT , and D∗. For each t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, if v̂i −
v̂j ∈ Dt, then we collect v̂i and v̂j in Ẑt. Algorithm 1 illustrates how to implement this
step.
7) Define the weight of dt as W (dt) =
∑
v̂∈Ẑt4F̂z˜′ (v̂). Use the NL + NM vectors in D∗
with the largest weights as estimates of the columns of [Z ′1,Z
′
2].
8) Employ (5) to estimate
[
h1
|h1| , . . . ,
hNL
|hNL |
, g1|g1| , . . . ,
gNM
|gNM |
]
up to a permutation of the columns
and up to a phase ambiguity on each column, from the estimated [Z ′1,Z
′
2] obtained in 7).
Steps 1)-4) are designed to obtain the estimator in (15), and the estimation of Z . The performance
of steps 1)-4) is guaranteed by Proposition 2. Steps 5)-7) are obtained by respectively modifying
steps P1-P3 a little bit. Compared to steps P1-P3, in step 5), D is obtained from Ẑ rather than
Z . Note that we use Ẑ to approximate Z for practical application. Ẑ often contains many
more points than Z as shown in Fig. 3. To solve this problem, step 6) first clusters all pairwise
differences by defining Dt =
{
d ∈ D :
∣∣∣∣ dHdt∣∣d∣∣∣∣dt∣∣ − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ}. Step 7) uses a likelihood metric to
approximately obtain the set of covering pairwise difference vectors among the clusters obtained
in step 6).
Remark 3 The proposed method obtains partial CSI. Comparing with full CSI, i.e., [H ,G], the
obtained result still has the permutation of columns and the phase ambiguity in each column.
This observation is similar to some blind source separation methods (e.g., ICA), and needs
further processing to obtain full CSI. Nevertheless, unlike the existing methods, it is clear that
Algorithm 1 Achieving Ẑ1, Ẑ2, . . . , ẐT by step 6)
1: D = {d′1,d′2 . . .d′|D|}, Ẑ = {v̂1, v̂2, . . . , v̂|Ẑ|}, t = 1.
2: d1 = d
′
1, D∗ = {d1}.
3: while D 6= ∅ do
4: Dt = ∅, Ẑt = ∅
5: for j = 1 to |D| do
6: if
∣∣∣∣ d′Hj dt∣∣d′Hj ∣∣∣∣dt∣∣ − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ then
7: Dt ⇐= d′j
8: end if
9: j ← j + 1
10: end for
11: for i = 1 to
∣∣∣Ẑ∣∣∣ do
12: for k = i+ 1 to
∣∣∣Ẑ∣∣∣ do
13: if v̂i − v̂k ∈ Dt then
14: Ẑt ⇐= v̂i, Ẑt ⇐= v̂k
15: end if
16: k ← k + 1
17: end for
18: i← i+ 1
19: end for
20: D ← D −Dt, D =
{
d′1,d
′
2 . . .d
′
|D|
}
,t← t+ 1, dt = d′1, D∗ ⇐= {d′1}.
21: end while
the proposed method does not require the a priori knowledge of Z or the symbol alphabets of
the LUs and MUs, and thus imposes no restriction on the statistic dependence between symbols
of the LUs and MUs.
D. Complexity analysis
We proceed to briefly analyze the computational complexity of the blind channel separation
method described in Section III-C as follows:
1) The SVD operations, which has a complexity O (max{M2n, n3}), dominates in step 1).
2) Quantizing the columns of Z and obtaining4Fz˜ require O (nMm1) complexity in step 2).
3) The FFT (and IFFT) operations in step 3) perform (NL+NM)-dimensional m2-point FFT.
Hence the complexity of step 3) is O
(
(NL +NM)m
(NL+NM )
2 logm2
)
.
4)-8) Notice that |Z| = ∏NLi=1 |Ai|∏NMj=1 |Bj|. By Proposition 2, ∣∣∣Ẑ∣∣∣ ≈ |Z| for large m2 and
n. In addition, T ≤ |D| ≤
∣∣∣Ẑ∣∣∣2 ≈ |Z|2. Hence, the complexity of steps 4)–7) can be
approximately upper bounded by O
(
(NL +NM)
(∏NL
i=1 |Ai|
∏NM
j=1 |Bj|
)3)
.
Recall that m2 = Ω(m31) and we would often choose a large m2 that gives(∏NL
i=1 |Ai|
∏NM
j=1 |Bj|
)3
≤ m(NL+NM )2 logm2. Therefore, the total complexity of the blind channel
separation method can be characterized by
O (max{M2n, n3})+O (nMm2) +O ((NL +NM)m(NL+NM )2 logm2) .
Notice that the computation complexity of the proposed method is higher than the existing
methods. For example, the complexity of FastICA is no more than O (max{M2n, n3}) +
O (nM2m2)[32], [33]. Nevertheless, ICA methods require the a priori knowledge of Z and
statistic independence between symbols of the LUs and MUs, while the proposed method does
not require that. In other words, the proposed method imposes less restrictions on MUs at cost of
its computation complexity. In that sense, the proposed method may be more suitable to combat
against the MUs whose misbehavior is out of the control of the BS, as long as the computation
capability of the BS is sufficient.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present our simulation results to evaluate the performance of the blind
channel separation (BCS) method described in Section III-C. In the simulation, we generate
100, 000 instances of the channel vectors based on the block Rayleigh fading model. That is,
the elements of each column in H and G are chosen as i.i.d. CSCG random variables with
mean 0 mean and variance 1. We then average performance metric, given later, over 100, 000
channel realizations. We choose α1 = α2 and m1 = m2 = 64. We consider the antenna array
sizes of M = 64 and M = 128, and two different numbers of observation instances, namely,
n = 300 and n = 500, respectively. Each LU sends symbols with power of Ps. The ratio Psσ2 is
the per-antenna signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the LU’s signal. We vary the SNR value in the
simulation to evaluate the channel separation performance of the proposed method.
A. Performance metric
Let h be a column of [H ,G], and Ph = hh
H
|h|2 be the projection on the subspace spanned by
h. Consider the jth legitimate user. Suppose that d is an uplink channel direction vector from
this user to the BS obtained by some channel estimation algorithm. By reciprocity, downlink
beamforming is performed based on d. Then, |Phjd|2 is the power directed to the jth legitimate
user by the BS. On the other hand, the total power leaked to other legitimate users and malicious
users is given by
∑NL
l=1,l 6=j |Phld|2 +
∑NM
k=1 |Pgkd|2. Hence, the directed-to-leakage power ratio
(DLPR)
|Phjd|2∑NL
l=1,l 6=j |Phld|2 +
∑NM
k=1 |Pgkd|2
(16)
measures the ratio of the power directed to the jth legitimate user to the power leaked to all others
if d is employed to perform beamforming based on channel reciprocity. Clearly, substituting
d =
hj
|hj | in (16) obtains the DLPR value when the channel direction estimation is perfect.
Now, let Ĥ =
[
ĥ1, . . . , ĥNL+NM
]
be the channel direction vectors estimated using the blind
channel separation scheme described in Section III-C. Since we do not know which column of
Ĥ corresponds to hj , we consider the maximum among the DLPRs of all the possibilities:
DLPRj(H ,G) , max
i∈{1,2,...,NL+NM}
|Phj ĥi|2∑NL
l=1,l 6=j |Phlĥi|2 +
∑NM
k=1 |Pgkĥi|2
.
Finally, we conservatively use the worst-case DLPR among all the legitimate users as our
performance metric:
DLPR(H ,G) , min
j∈{1,2,...,NL}
DLPRj(H ,G). (17)
Note that the DLPR in (17) is a function of the channel vectors [H ,G].
B. Simulation
We first consider a PSA scenario with two LUs and one MU. The MU conducts PSA by
sending equally likely random BPSK symbols as those of LUs. The BPSK symbols of all these
three users are independent with each other. We simulate DLPR achieved by perfect CSI, our
proposed BCS scheme, and traditional ICA [32], respectively. The length of observations is
set to n = 300. Two array sizes of M = 128 and M = 64 are considered. Fig. 4 shows the
obtained result. Notice that it is a standard scenario for ICA since all users send independent
symbols. We observe from Fig. 4 that our proposed BCS outperforms ICA, and achieves near-
optimal performance. The performance improvement is coursed by the fact that our proposed
BCS attempts to cut down the impact of noise. In particular, revisiting (9), our proposed BCS
estimates distribution of desired signals (i.e., [Z ′1,Z
′
2]
 A
B
) by removing CF of noise from
CF of received noisy observations (i.e., Y ). On the other hand, ICA is derived for desired signals
without any noise, and then applied to the noisy observations straightforwardly.
Then, we consider a PJA scenario with two LUs and one MU. The LUs send equally likely
random BPSK symbols, while the MU conducts PJA by sending PAM symbols according to
its wiretapped signal from the LUs. In particular, PB1|A1(+3| + 1) = PB1|A1(−1| + 1) = 13 ,
PB1|A1(+1|+ 1) = PB1|A1(−3|+ 1) = 16 , PB1|A1(+1| − 1) = PB1|A1(+3| − 1) = 16 , PB1|A1(−1| −
1) = PB1|A1(−3| − 1) = 13 , where PB1|A1 denotes the conditional probability of symbol of
the MU given symbol sent by the first LU. The length of observations is set to n = 800. We
observe from the Fig. 5 that for M = 64 and M = 128, the proposed method achieves DLPR
close to that achieved by perfect CSI within 1dB. In contrast, even the per-antenna SNR reaches
16dB, the DLPR achieved by the traditional ICA scheme is only about 50% of that achieved
by the scheme with perfect CSI. This performance gap is brought by the fact that ICA requires
independence between symbols sent by users. In this scenario, the dependence between symbols
of these three users degrades the performance. Our proposed BCS works based on alphabet
estimation, imposing no restrict on statistic dependence between symbols of users. Therefore,
our proposed BCS outperforms ICA.
Finally, we simulate another PJA scenario with two LUs and two MUs. The MUs employ
non-stationary PAM attack. In particular, in odd instants, they send random symbols following
statistic distribution PB1(+3) = PB2(+3) =
1
3
, PB1(−1) = PB2(−1) = 23 . In even
instants, they send random symbols following statistic distribution PB1(+1) = PB2(+1) =
2
3
,
PB1(−1) = PB2(−1) = 13 . As shown in Fig. 6, for M = 64 and M = 128, our proposed BCS
still outperforms traditional ICA. ICA separates channels by minimizing a contrast function that
measure gaussianity of its output. Its employed contrast function may be not always suitable for
the non-stationary attack. As a result, the performance is degraded. On the contrast, Proposition
2 guarantees our proposed BCS is still available to non-stationary attack.
All the above results demonstrate that the proposed BCS method is effective in separating
and estimating the channel directions of the LU and the MU. With our proposed method, if the
MUs conduct attack, the attack signals will expose the MUs’ channel directions. Then, forced
by our proposed method, the MUs may have to keep silent, such that the BS cannot estimate
Fig. 4: DLPR performance under PSA scenario with NL = 2, NM = 1, and all users send BPSK
symbols.
Fig. 5: DLPR performance under PJA scenario where the malicious user sends symbols correlated
to those of legitimate users.
their channel vectors. Nevertheless, in such case, without interference of the MUs, the BS can
get the CSI of the LUs. As a result, the BS is able to focus its power along the direction of the
LUs, while the leakage to the MUs is little due to quasi-orthogonality of the channel vectors in
MMIMO system. In summary, the MUs cannot achieve its goal of eavesdropping the downlink
information. As a beneficial result, the security of the system is guaranteed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a BCS method to differentiate the channel directions from the LU and
MU to the BS in the uplink of a MMIMO system. With channel reciprocity, the BS is able to
use the channel directions to steer the beam toward the LUs and MUs separately with minimal
power and information leakage, and further verify their identities by use of some higher layer
Fig. 6: DLPR performance under PJA scenario where the malicious user sends symbols according
to varying distribution.
authentication protocols. Simulation results have shown that the proposed method can achieve
good channel separation performance in terms of achieving good DLPR performance at low to
moderate per-antenna SNR and near-perfect DLPR performance at high SNR. It is also noted
that even when the MUs are allowed to impersonate the LUs by sending symbols of distribution
identical to that of the LUs’ symbols, the proposed scheme still works very well. Moreover,
the proposed method does not requires the BS to have any partial CSI of the channels a priori.
The complexity of the method is polynomial in the number of antennas and the number of
observation instants, but is exponential in the number of users. Thus the method is most suitable
for the practical use when the number of users is small. As an extension to the current work, it
is interesting to investigate wheatear the knowledge of the LUs’ symbols (such as pilot symbols)
can be utilized to reduce the complexity of the channel separation method.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: Let Aj =
{
aj,1, . . . , aj,|Aj |
}
and Bk =
{
bk,1, . . . , bk,|Bk|
}
. Without loss of general-
ization, we focus on the direction of z′1,j . For an arbitrary point u in Z , we may write it as
u = aj,sz
′
1,j + z
′, for some s ∈ {1, . . . , |Aj|}, and z′ =
∑NL
j′=1,j 6=j′ aj′z
′
1,j′ +
∑NM
k=1 bkz
′
2,k. Then
there must exist another point u′ ∈ Z satisfying u′ = aj,s′z′1,1 + z′ with some s′ 6= s. Because
the difference
u′ − u = (aj,s′ − aj,s)z′1,j,
u and u′ are covered by z′1,j according to Definition 1. It is obvious that this same argument
applies to every point in Z and every direction in {z′1,1, . . . ,z′1,NL , z′2,1, . . . ,z′2,NM}. Hence,
every vector in
{
z′1,1, . . . ,z
′
1,NL
, z′2,1, . . . ,z
′
2,NM
}
covers Z .
Furthermore, without loss of generalization, consider the vector c1,jz′1,j + c2,kz
′
2,k. Focus on
the point
v = aj,sˆz
′
1,j + bk,tˆz
′
2,k + z¯
′ ∈ Z
where z¯′ =
∑NL
j′=1,j 6=j aj′z
′
1,j′ +
∑NM
k′=1,k′ 6=k bk′z
′
2,k′ . aj,sˆ and bk,tˆ are chosen according to sˆ =
arg
s∈S
min=
{
c2
c1
aj,s
}
, where S =
{
s : arg mins∈{1,2,...,|Aj |}<
{
c2
c1
aj,s
}}
and
tˆ = arg
t∈T
max={bk,t} .
where T = {t : arg maxt∈{1,2,...,|Bk|}<{bk,t}}.
If there were a different v′ ∈ Z such that v′ and v are covered by c1,jz′1,j + c2,kz′2,k, notice
that columns of {z′1,1, . . . ,z′1,NLz′2,1, . . . ,z′2,NM } are linearly independent, then v′ could be rewritten
as v′ = a′j,sz
′
1,j + b
′
k,tz
′
2,k + z¯
′, where for some s ∈ 1, . . . , |Aj| and t ∈ 1, . . . , |Bk| satisfying
bk,tˆ − bk,t =
c2
c1
(aj,sˆ − aj,s) . (18)
We will show that (18) is always not true. Since c2
c1
aj,sˆ has the smallest real part
among c2
c1
aj,1,
c2
c1
aj,2, . . . ,
c2
c1
aj,|Aj |, for s /∈ S, i.e., <
{
c2
c1
aj,sˆ
}
6= <
{
c2
c1
aj,s
}
, we have
<
{
c2
c1
(aj,sˆ − aj,s)
}
< 0. On the other hand, bk,tˆ has the largest real part among Bk, which
indicates <{bk,tˆ − bk,t} ≥ 0. Hence, (18) is not true for <{ c2c1 aj,sˆ} 6= <{ c2c1 aj,s}. For some
s ∈ S that <
{
c2
c1
aj,sˆ
}
= <
{
c2
c1
aj,s
}
, notice that c2
c1
aj,sˆ also has the smallest imaginary part among
those whose real part equal to <
{
c2
c1
aj,sˆ
}
, we thus have c2
c1
(aj,sˆ − aj,s) = i=
{
c2
c1
aj,sˆ − c2c1 aj,s
}
,
where
=
{
c2
c1
aj,sˆ − c2
c1
aj,s
}
< 0
for <
{
c2
c1
aj,sˆ
}
= <
{
c2
c1
aj,s
}
. In such case, bk,t satisfying (18) have the same real part as bk,tˆ.
bk,tˆ also has the largest imaginary part among those whose real part equal to bk,tˆ, which indicates
bk,tˆ − bk,t = i=
{
bk,tˆ − bk,t
}
, and
={bk,tˆ − bk,t} > 0.
As a result, (18) neither can be established for <
{
c2
c1
aj,sˆ
}
= <
{
c2
c1
aj,s
}
. We obtain that at least
v = aj,sˆz
′
1,j + bk,tˆz
′
2,k + z¯
′ cannot be covered by c1,jz′1,j + c2,kz
′
2,k. The same argument also
generalizes for each vector of the form
∑NL
j=1 c1,jz
′
1,j +
∑NM
k=1 c2,kz
′
2,k. The proposition is thus
proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We first illustrate in Appendix B.A how the empirical distribution of the BS’s observations
is determined by attack actions, channels and added noise. Then, in Appendix B.B, we show
that Φ4Fz˜ (ω) asymptotically approaches to the product of Φ4Fz˜′ (ω) and ΦFn (ω). Finally, in
in Appendix B.C, we complete the proof by using FFT and IFFT to get Φ4Fz˜ (ω) and 4F̂z˜′ ,
respectively.
A. Preliminary
For k = 1, . . . , |Z˜| and j = 1, . . . , |Z˜ ′|, we define
fz|z′ (u |v˜j ) =
√
M
σ
√
pi
exp
{
−|u− v˜j|
2
σ2
2M
}
(19)
and
Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j ) =
∫
u∈B(u˜k)
fz|z′ (u |v˜j ) du, (20)
where u and u˜k are m1 × 1 vectors. We rewrite u and u˜k as u = [u1, . . . , uNL+NM ]T
and u˜k =
[
uk1 , . . . , ukNL+NM
]T
. Notice u˜k ∈ Z , hence the ith element of u˜k is
uki ∈ {u˜1, . . . , u˜m1}, i = 1, . . . , NL + NM . Then B (u˜k) in (20) is given by B (u˜k) =
{u : ui ∈ B (uki) , i = 1, . . . , NT +NM}.
Lemma 1. For k = 1, . . . , |Z˜|, 4Fz˜n (u˜k) →
∑|Z˜′|
j=1 4Fz˜′n (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j ) in probability as
n and m2 approach to infinity with n = Ω
(
m
2(NL+NM )
2
)
. To be more precise, for sufficient large
m2 and n with n = Ω
(
m
2(NL+NM )
2
)
, we have
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣4Fz˜ (u˜k)−
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ µ
 ≤ 1µ2O (δNL+NM2 ) .
Please see Appendix C for the proof of Lemma 1. From Lemma 1, it is easy to get the
following corollary:
Corollary 1. By choosing m2 = Ω (m31), we have∑|Z˜|
k=1
∣∣∣∣4Fz˜ (u˜k)−∑|Z˜′|j=1 4Fz˜′ (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )∣∣∣∣→ 0 in probability.
Proof:
Pr

|Z˜|∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣4Fz˜ (u˜k)−
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ µ1

<
|Z˜|∑
k=1
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣4Fz˜ (u˜k)−
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
µ1∣∣∣Z˜∣∣∣

<
∣∣∣Z˜∣∣∣3
µ2
O (δNL+NM2 ) ,
where the last inequality follows Lemma 1. Recall that |Z˜| = mNL+NM1 and m2 = 2α2δ2 + 1.
Therefore, choosing m2 = Ω (m31) will prove the corollary.
B. Convergences of characteristic functions
To obtain the proof of Proposition 2, we employ an auxiliary random variable u, which is spec-
ified by u = u′+n, where the pmf of u′ is given by Pu′ (v˜j) = 4Fz˜′ (v˜j) for j = 1, . . . ,
∣∣∣Z˜ ′∣∣∣, and
u′ is independent of n. Hence, the pdf of u is given by fu (u) =
∑|Z˜′|
j=1 4Fz˜′ (v˜j) fz|z′ (u |v˜j ).
According to the fact that u′ is independent of n, we have
Φ (fu) = Φ (4Fz˜′) Φ (fn) , (21)
where Φ (4Fz˜′) =
∑|Z˜′|
j=1 4Fz˜′ (v˜j) exp
{
−i [<{v˜j} ,={v˜j}]T ω
}
and Φ (fn) =
exp
{
−|ω|2 σ2
4M
}
. On the other hand, according to the expression of fu (u), Φ (fu) is
given by
Φ (fu (u)) =
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j)
∫ +∞
−∞
fz|z′ (u |v˜j ) exp
{
−i [<{u} ,={u}]T ω
}
du. (22)
Hence, we have∣∣∣∣ ∫ +∞−∞ fz|z′ (u |v˜j ) exp
{
−i [<{u} ,={u}]T ω
}
du−
|Z˜|∑
k=1
Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j ) exp
{
−i [<{u˜k} ,={u˜k}]T ω
} ∣∣∣∣
< γm1 ,
where limm1→∞ γm1 = 0. Then, we have
∣∣ |Z˜|∑
k=1
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j ) exp
{
−i [<{u˜k} ,={u˜k}]T ω
}
− Φ (fu (u))
∣∣ ≤ γm1 (23)
Based on Corollary 1, and the fact that Φ (·) is an orthogonal transformation, we get for arbitrary
frequency ω, there has
|Z˜|∑
k=1
4Fz˜ (u˜k) exp
{
−i [<{u˜k} ,={u˜k}]T ω
}
→
|Z˜|∑
k=1
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j ) exp
{
−i [<{u˜k} ,={u˜k}]T ω
}
(24)
in probability as m1 →∞, m2 →∞, and n→∞. This convergence follows the fact that
∣∣ |Z˜|∑
k=1
{ |Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )−
|Z˜|∑
k=1
4Fz˜ (u˜k)
}
exp
{
−i [<{u˜k} ,={u˜k}]T ω
} ∣∣
<
|Z˜|∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )−
|Z˜|∑
k=1
4Fz˜ (u˜k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (25)
Apply Corollary 1 to (25), we can obtain the convergence given by (24).
Further, we have
Pr
{∣∣ |Z˜|∑
k=1
4Fz˜ (u˜k) exp
{
−i [<{u˜k} ,={u˜k}]T ω
}
−
exp
{
− σ
2
4M
|ω|2
} |Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j) exp
{
−i [<{v˜j} ,={v˜j}]T ω
} ∣∣ ≥ µ1} (26)
≤ Pr{∣∣ |Z˜|∑
k=1
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j ) exp
{
−i [<{u˜k} ,={u˜k}]T ω
}
−
exp
{
− σ
2
4M
|ω|2
} |Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j) exp
{
−i [<{v˜j} ,={v˜j}]T ω
} ∣∣ ≥ µ1
2
}
+ Pr
{∣∣ |Z˜|∑
k=1
4Fz˜ (u˜k) exp
{
−i [<{u˜k} ,={u˜k}]T ω
}
−
|Z˜|∑
k=1
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j ) exp
{
−i [<{u˜k} ,={u˜k}]T ω
} ∣∣ ≥ µ1
2
}
.
Based on (23) and (24), the two items on the right side of (26) approach to zero. We thus finally
get∑|Z˜|
k=14Fz˜ (u˜k) exp
{
−i [<{u˜k} ,={u˜k}]T ω
}
exp
{− σ2
4M
|ω|2} →
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j) exp
{
−i [<{v˜j} ,={v˜j}]T ω
}
(27)
in probability as m1 →∞, m2 →∞, and n→∞. The left side of (27) is what the BS observes,
the right side of (27) is what the BS intends to estimate. Hence, we may estimate 4Fz˜′ (v˜j)
according to (27).
On the other hand, notice that
|Z|∑
j=1
4Fz˜ (u˜j) exp
{
−i [<{u˜k} ,={u˜k}]T ω
}
= exp
{
iα1
2NL+2NM∑
t=1
ωt
}
F1 (ω) ,
where
F1 (ω) =
m1∑
j1=1
· · ·
m1∑
j2NL+2NM=1
4Fz˜
([
uj1 , . . . , ujNL+NM
])
exp
{
−i
2NL+2NM∑
t=1
δ1 (jt − 1)ωt
}
.
And
|Z′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′ (v˜j) exp
{
−i [<{v˜j} ,={v˜j}]T ω
}
= exp
{
iα2
2NL+2NM∑
t=1
ωt
}
F2 (ω) , (28)
where
F2 (ω) =
m2−1∑
j1=1
· · ·
m2−1∑
j2NL+2NM=1
4Fz˜′
([
vj1 , . . . , vjNL+NM
])
exp
{
−i
2NL+2NM∑
t=1
δ2 (jt − 1)ωt
}
(29)
is obtained based on the assumption that <{Z} ⊆ [−α1, α1 − δ2]NM+NL , ={Z} ⊆
[−α1, α1 − δ2]NM+NL . To be more precise, for t = 1, . . . , 2NL + 2NM , if jt = m2,
4Fz˜′
([
vj1 , . . . , vjt , . . . vjNL+NM
])
= 0. These points in the boundary of quantization range are
trivial to estimation.
Then, (27) becomes
exp
{
iα1
∑2NL+2NM
t=1 ωt
}
exp
{
iα2
∑2NL+2NM
t=1 ωt
} F1 (ω)
exp
{− σ2
4M
|ω|2}︸ ︷︷ ︸
F ′1(ω)
→ F2 (ω) (30)
C. Complete the proof using FFT and IFFT
Let us choose ω fromW =
{
ω
∣∣∣ω1, . . . , ω2NL+2NM = 0, 2pim2δ2 , . . . , 2pi(m2−2)(m2−1)δ2 }. Recall that, we
set α1 = α2, then F ′1 (ω) in (30) becomes
F ′1 (ω) =
F1 (ω)
exp
{− σ2
4M
|ω|2} . (31)
By setting α1 = α2, 2α1 = (m1 − 1)δ1, 2α2 = (m2 − 1)δ2, and m2−1m1−1 is integer, F1 (ω) over
ω ∈ W could be reshaped as
F1 (ω) =
m1∑
j1=1
· · ·
m1∑
jNL+NM=1
4Fz˜
([
uj1 , . . . , ujNL+NM
])
exp
{
−i
2NL+2NM∑
t=1
δ1 (jt − 1) 2pikt
(m2 − 1)δ2
}
(32)
=
m1∑
j1=1
· · ·
m1∑
j2NL+2NM=1
4Fz˜
([
uj1 , . . . , ujNL+NM
])
exp
{
−i
2NL+2NM∑
t=1
(jt − 1) 2pikt
(m1 − 1)
}
,
where ω = [ω1, . . . , ω2NL+2NM ], the first equation is based on the fact that ω ∈ W indicates
for t = 1, . . . , NL + NM , ωt = 2pikt(m2−1)δ2 , kt = 0, . . .m2 − 2. The second equation is based on
setup that α1 = α2, 2α1 = (m1 − 1)δ1, 2α2 = (m2 − 1)δ2. The second equation of (32) is
just (2NL+ 2NM) dimension FFT expression of 4Fz˜
([
uj1 , . . . , ujNL+NM
])
over m1−1 points.
Hence, F ′1 (ω) could be obtained by applying FFT to 4Fz˜
([
uj1 , . . . , ujNL+NM
])
. Similarly, all
values of F2 (ω) over ω ∈ W , is the (2NL + 2NM)-dimension FFT of 4Fz˜′ over m2−1 points,
i.e.,
4Fz˜′ = Φ−1
(
F2 (ω)|ω∈W
)
. (33)
Recall that Φ−1 (·) denotes inverse FFT operation. F2 (ω)|ω∈W denotes the sequence that all
values of F2 (ω) over ω ∈ W .
By applying inverse (2NL + 2NM)-FFT transform to F ′1 (ω), ω ∈ W , we complete the
calculation of the estimator 4F̂z˜′ (15).
4F̂z˜′ = Φ−1
(
F ′1 (ω)|ω∈W
)
(34)
where F ′1 (ω)|ω∈W denotes the sequence that F
′
1 (ω) over ω ∈ W .
On the other hand, the convergence of (30) indicates |F ′1 (ω)− F2 (ω)| ≤ m2 in probability,
m2 → 0, as m2, m1, and n approach to infinity. IFFT operation is orthogonal transformation,
hence, we have ∣∣Φ−1 (F ′1 (ω))− Φ−1 (F2 (ω))∣∣ ≤ m2 (35)
According to (34), it is equivalent to
∣∣∣4Fz˜′ (v˜j)−4F̂z˜′ (v˜j)∣∣∣ ≤ m2 for j = 1, 2, . . . , ∣∣∣Z˜ ′∣∣∣,
m2 → 0 as m1 and m2 approach to infinity.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: The goal of Lemma 1 is to prove
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣4Fz˜n (u˜k)−
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
4Fz˜′n (v˜j)Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ
 =
Pr
{ ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
∑ni=1 1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
)
1i (zi ∈ B (u˜k))
n
−
∑n
i=1 1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
)
n
Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > µ
}
.
(36)
Using the Chebyshev inequality, we obtain
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
∑ni=1 1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
)
1i (zi ∈ B (u˜k))
n
−
∑n
i=1 1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
)
n
Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> µ

≤ 1
µ2
|Z˜′|∑
j=1
|Z˜′|∑
j′=1
E (HjHj′) , (37)
where E (HjHj′) can be further extended in
E
(
HjHj′
)
=
E
(∑n
i=1 1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
) (
1i (zi ∈ B (u˜k))− Pz˜|z′
(
u˜k
∣∣v˜j ))) (∑ni=1 1i (z˜′i = v˜j′) (1i (zi ∈ B (u˜k))− Pz˜|z′ (u˜k ∣∣∣v˜j′ )))
n2
<
1
n
+
E
(∑n
i=1
∑n
i’=1,i 6=i 1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
) (
1i (zi ∈ B (u˜k))− Pz˜|z′
(
u˜k
∣∣v˜j )) 1i′ (z˜′i′ = v˜j′) (1i′ (zi′ ∈ B (u˜k))− Pz˜|z′ (u˜k ∣∣∣v˜j′ )))
n2
<
1
n
+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i′=1,i 6=i E
(
1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
)
1i′
(
z˜′i′ = v˜j′
)
1i (zi ∈ B (u˜k)) 1i′
(
zi′ ∈ B (u˜k)
))
n2
−
∑n
i=1
∑n
i′=1,i 6=i E
(
1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
)
1i′
(
z˜′i′ = v˜j′
)
1i (zi ∈ B (u˜k))Pz˜|z′
(
u˜k
∣∣∣v˜j′ ))
n2
−
∑n
i=1
∑n
i′=1,i 6=i E
(
1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
)
1i′
(
z˜′i′ = v˜j′
)
1i′
(
zi′ ∈ B (u˜k)
)
Pz˜|z′
(
u˜k
∣∣v˜j ))
n2
+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i′=1,i 6=i E
(
1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
)
1i′
(
z˜′i′ = v˜j′
)
Pz˜|z′
(
u˜k
∣∣∣v˜j′ )Pz˜|z′ (u˜k ∣∣v˜j ))
n2
=
1
n
+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i′=1,i 6=i Pz˜′i,z˜′i′
(
v˜j , v˜j′
)
Gi,i′,j,j′
n2
. (38)
Gi,i′,j,j′ is given by
Gi,i′,j,j′ = Pzi,zi′ |z˜′i,z˜′i′ (zi ∈ B (u˜k) , zi′ ∈ B (u˜k) |v˜j , v˜j′ )− Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j′ )Pzi|z˜′i,z˜′i′ (zi ∈ B (u˜k) |v˜j , v˜j′ )
− Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )Pzi′ |z˜′i,z˜′i′ (zi′ ∈ B (u˜k) |v˜j , v˜j′ ) + Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j′ ) . (39)
For further bounding on Gi,i′,j,j′ , we note
Pzi,zi′ |z˜′i,z˜′i′ (zi ∈ B (u˜k) , zi′ ∈ B (u˜k) |v˜j , v˜j′ ) =∫
vi∈B(v˜j)
∫
vi′∈B(v˜j′) Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |vi )Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |vi′ ) fz′i,z′i′ (vi,vi′) dvidvi′∫
vi∈B(v˜j)
∫
vi′∈B(v˜j′) fz′i,z′i′ (vi,vi′) dvidvi′
and
Pzi|z˜′i,z˜′i′ (zi ∈ B (u˜k) |v˜j , v˜j′ ) =
∫
vi∈B(v˜j)
∫
vi′∈B(v˜j′) Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |vi ) fz′i,z′i′ (vi,vi′) dvidvi′∫
vi∈B(v˜j)
∫
vi′∈B(v˜j′) fz′i,z′i′ (vi,vi′) dvidvi′
. (40)
Hence, we have
Pzi,zi′ |z˜′i,z˜′i′ (zi ∈ B (u˜k) , zi′ ∈ B (u˜k) |v˜j , v˜j′ )− Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j′ )Pzi|z˜′i,z˜′i′ (zi ∈ B (u˜k) |v˜j , v˜j′ ) ≤
max
vi∈B(v˜j),vi′∈B(v˜j′)
Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |vi )Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |vi′ )− min
vi∈B(v˜j),vi′∈B(v˜j′)
Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |vi )Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |vi′ ) (41)
According to the Cauchy mean value theorem, for closed domain B (v˜j) and B (v˜j′), we have
max
vi∈B(v˜j),vi′∈B(v˜j′)
Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |vi )Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |vi′ )− min
vi∈B(v˜j),vi′∈B(v˜j′)
Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |vi )Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |vi′ ) ≤ c1δNL+NM2
(42)
where c1 is a constant that depends on Pz˜|z′ (· |·). Similarly, we can obtain
Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j′ )− Pz˜|z′ (u˜k |v˜j )Pzi′ |z˜′i,z˜′i′ (zi′ ∈ B (u˜k) |v˜j , v˜j′ ) ≤ c2δ
NL+NM
2
for closed domain B (v˜j) and B (v˜j′), c2 is a constant depends on Pz˜|z′ (· |·). Therefore, Gi,i′,j,j′
can be bound as
Gi,i′,j,j′ ≤ (c1 + c2) δNL+NM2 . (43)
We define a set J , where {j, j′} ∈ J means B (v˜j) and B (v˜j′) are closed domains.
On the other hand, notice that the alphabets are finite, <{Z} ⊆ [−α1, α1 − δ2]NM+NL ,
={Z} ⊆ [−α1, α1 − δ2]NM+NL , and thus {j, j′} ∈ J , Pz˜′i,z˜′i′ (v˜j, v˜j′) = 0 as the quantization
ranges approach infinity. Therefore, (37) becomes
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣Z˜′∣∣∣∑
j=1
∑ni=1 1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
)
1i (zi ∈ B (u˜k))
n
−
∑n
i=1 1i
(
z˜′i = v˜j
)
n
Pz˜|z′
(
u˜k
∣∣v˜j )

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hj
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> µ

≤ 1
µ2
∣∣∣Z˜′∣∣∣∑
j=1
∣∣∣Z˜′∣∣∣∑
j′=1
E
(
HjHj′
)
(44)
=
1
µ2

∣∣∣Z˜′∣∣∣2
n
+
∑
{j,j′}∈J
∑n
i=1
∑n
i’=1,i 6=i Pz˜′i,z˜′i′
(
v˜j , v˜j′
)
Gi,i′,j,j′
n2
+
∑
{j,j′}∈J
∑n
i=1
∑n
i’=1,i 6=i Pz˜′i,z˜′i′
(
v˜j , v˜j′
)
Gi,i′,j,j′
n2

≤ 1
µ2

∣∣∣Z˜′∣∣∣2
n
+
∑
{j,j′}∈J
n2P
z˜′i,z˜′i′
(
v˜j , v˜j′
)
c (NL +NM ) δ
NL+NM
2
n2
+
∑n
i=1
∑n
i’=1,i 6=i
∑
{j,j′}∈J Pz˜′i,z˜′i′
(
v˜j , v˜j′
)
n2

≤ 1
µ2

∣∣∣Z˜′∣∣∣2
n
+ (c1 + c2) δ
NL+NM
2 +
∑n
i=1
∑n
i’=1,i 6=i
∑
{j,j′}∈J Pz˜′i,z˜′i′
(
v˜j , v˜j′
)
n2
 = 1µ2

∣∣∣Z˜′∣∣∣2
n
+ (c1 + c2) δ
NL+NM
2

and the proof is completed.
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